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John A. Humphrey [9]John Arthur Humphrey [1]
  1. Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language.John A. Humphrey - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW), if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics (a failure that is justified, in part, by Kripke’s text) to recognize and (...)
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  2.  1
    Quine, Kripke’s Wittgenstein, Simplicity, and Sceptical Solutions.John A. Humphrey - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):43-55.
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  3.  43
    Quine, Kripke’s Wittgenstein, Simplicity, and Sceptical Solutions.John A. Humphrey - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):43-55.
  4.  9
    Some Objections To Garavaso’s Wittgenstein.John A. Humphrey - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):303-327.
  5.  11
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story?John A. Humphrey - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein, if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual and an individual (...)
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  6.  21
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language.John A. Humphrey - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein , if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual and an (...)
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  7.  15
    Some Objections to Putnam’s “Consistency Objection”.John A. Humphrey - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:127-141.
    This paper is a critical analysis of Putnam’s “consistency objection,” an objection made against a particular reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics (“up-to-us-ism”). I show that Putnam’s objection presupposes a rather unlikely version of Wittgenstein’s “up-to-us-ism” and is unable to undermine a more likely anti-Platonist version. I also show that a companion argument, (the “something more” argument) is unable to overturn this more sophisticated anti-Platonist version of Wittgenstein’s up-to-us-ism. Along the way I try to clarify Wittgenstein’s anti-Plalonist account of mathematics, (...)
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  8.  3
    Some Objections to Putnam’s “Consistency Objection”.John A. Humphrey - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:127-141.
    This paper is a critical analysis of Putnam’s “consistency objection,” an objection made against a particular reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. I show that Putnam’s objection presupposes a rather unlikely version of Wittgenstein’s “up-to-us-ism” and is unable to undermine a more likely anti-Platonist version. I also show that a companion argument, is unable to overturn this more sophisticated anti-Platonist version of Wittgenstein’s up-to-us-ism. Along the way I try to clarify Wittgenstein’s anti-Plalonist account of mathematics, so that others do not (...)
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  9.  3
    Some Objections To Garavaso’s Wittgenstein.John A. Humphrey - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):303-327.
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