4 found
Jonathan Trigg [3]Jonathan David Trigg [1]
  1.  18
    Review of "Varieties of Presence". [REVIEW]Jonathan Trigg - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):11.
  2. Explaining How the Mind Works: On the Relation Between Cognitive Science and Philosophy.Jonathan Trigg & Michael Kalish - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):399-424.
    In this paper, we argue that under certain prevalent interpretations of the nature and aims of cognitive science, theories of cognition generate a forced choice between a conception of cognition which depends on the possibility of a private language, and a conception of cognition which depends on mereological confusions. We argue, further, that this should not pose a fundamental problem for cognitive scientists since a plausible interpretation of the nature and aims of cognitive science is available that does not generate (...)
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  3.  15
    The Philosophy of Ordinary Language is a Naturalistic Philosophy.Jonathan Trigg - 2010 - Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):6.
    It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the claim that it (...)
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  4.  68
    Representation, Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience.Jonathan David Trigg - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):5-30.
    In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on (...)
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