Superstars are not by accident a conspicuous phenomenon in our culture, but inherently belong to a meritocratic society with mass media, free enterprise, and competition. To make this contention plausible I will use Caillois's book, Man, Play and Games, to compare the mechanisms underlying the superstar phenomenon with a special kind of game, as set out by Caillois. As far as I know, Caillois's book is not quoted in the literature dealing with income distribution theories, although the comparison with play (...) and games is, for limited purposes, interesting. In play and games we find almost all elements which play a role in theories of just income distribution: equality of opportunity, chance, talent, competition and skill, reward, entitlement, winners and losers, etc. These are not chance similarities, for “… games are largely dependent upon the cultures in which they are practised. They affect their preferences, prolong their customs, and reflect their beliefs … One … can … posit a truly reciprocal relationship between a society and the games it likes to play”. Moreover, as we will see, superstars combine the four basic characteristics of play that make their activities a special kind of play. (shrink)

In this article it will be argued that it is a misapprehension to think that there is just one ‘state of affairs’ within an organization. Yet, many organizations seriously try to create the impression that there is indeed just one state of affairs. This certainly goes for hierarchically structured organizations. Therefore, various imbroglios and paradoxes arising in this way will here be briefly highlighted.

Introduction -- The values surveys -- How to read the tables -- Changing beliefs and values -- Cross-national variation and trajectories of changing beliefs and values -- Economic development interacts with a society's cultural heritage -- Technical notes -- Questionnaire development -- Sampling procedures -- Fieldwork -- Principal investigators -- 1981-1984 wave -- 1989-1993 wave -- 1995-1997 wave -- 1999-2004 wave -- Creating the integrated dataset.

(1996). The ethos of individualism in cross‐cultural perspective: Exploring the European values data. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 645-651.

An enterprising odyssey might be one way to investigate whether a unique role is afforded to ‘a’ philosophy of management. The question is, first, which philosophy is at stake and what finery such a philosophy might bear. Second, three cardinal questions arise: (1) “What can we say about it?” (2) “How do we know we can or cannot say something about it?” and (3) “What is its relation to rationality?” Third, by an old scepticist tradition one may choose tantalising inner (...) subjects to punctuate these questions. In this case, the inner subject will run: “Is pathology dysfunctional?” A survey of related problems and possible solutions mingled with suspension follows on from this. Supported by appropriate non-philosophical disciplines, it will serve as a crowbar to reappraise the relation between critical management studies and organisational studies on the one hand and philosophy of management on the other. (shrink)

This article challenges the general thesis that an unconditional basic income, set at the highest sustainable level, is required for maximizing the income-leisure opportunities of the least advantaged, when income varies according to the responsible factor of labor input. In a linear optimal taxation model (of a type suggested by Vandenbroucke 2001) in which opportunities depend only on individual productivity, adding the instrument of a uniform wage subsidy generates an array of undominated policies besides the basic income maximizing policy, including (...) a “zero basic income” policy which equalizes the post-tax wage rate. The choice among such undominated policies may be guided by distinct normative criteria which supplement the maximin objective in various ways. It is shown that most of these criteria will be compatible with, or actually select, the zero basic income policy and reject the basic income maximizing one. In view of the model's limited realism, the force of this main conclusion is discussed both in relation to Van Parijs' argument for basic income in Real Freedom for All (1995) and to some key empirical conditions in the real world. Footnotes1 I am grateful for useful comments on various stages of this paper by Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, Mathias Hild, Dirk Van de gaer, Frank Vandenbroucke, Alex Voorhoeve, Roland van der Veen, Andrew Williams, Chris Woodard and an anonymous referee. Above all I thank Loek Groot for his contribution. The research has also been supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and the Social and Political Theory Program of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. (shrink)