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  1.  63
    Determining the Environment: A Modal Logic for Closed Interaction.Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Meyer & Paolo Turrini - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):351-369.
    The aim of the work is to provide a language to reason about Closed Interactions, i.e. all those situations in which the outcomes of an interaction can be determined by the agents themselves and in which the environment cannot interfere with they are able to determine. We will see that two different interpretations can be given of this restriction, both stemming from Pauly Representation Theorem. We will identify such restrictions and axiomatize their logic. We will apply the formal tools to (...)
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  2.  9
    Regulating Competing Coalitions: A Logic for Socially Optimal Group Choices.Paolo Turrini, Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop & John-Jules Meyer - 2012 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (1-2):181-202.
    In Multi Agent Systems it is often the case that individual preferences are not compatible and coalitions compete to achieve a given result. The paper presents a language to talk about the conflict between coalitional choices and it expresses deontic notions to evaluate them. We will be specifically concerned with cases where the collective perspective is at odds with the individual perspective.
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    Hard and Soft Preparation Sets in Boolean Games.Paul Harrenstein, Paolo Turrini & Michael Wooldridge - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (4):813-847.
    A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set (...)
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