In his early discussion of the structure of matter and motion, Leibniz quite explicitly appeals to Aristotle's characterization of continuity, and seems to adopt something like it as his own. Commentators usually assume that Leibniz continues to understand the notion of continuity in this way for the rest of his life. This paper argues that although he does continue to use something like the Aristotelian conception well into the mature period of his thought, he articulates a second sense of continuity (...) in his later writings that proves to be a greater importance to the exposition of his mature metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Imaginary Status of Shape: The “Diachronic” Argument The Dominant Synchronic Argument An Alternative Interpretation Shape and Idealism.

In this paper I challenge the common view that early in his career (1679-1695) Leibniz held that space and time are well-founded phenomena, entities on an ontological par with bodies and their properties. I argue that the evidence Leibniz ever held that space and time are well-founded phenomena is extremely weak and that there is a great deal of evidence for thinking that in the 1680s he held a position much like the one scholars rightly attribute to him in his (...) mature period, namely, that space and time are merely orders of existence and as such are purely abstract and occupy an ontological realm distinct from that of well-founded phenomena. In the course of arguing for this interpretation, I offer an account of the nature of Leibnizian phenomena which allows Leibniz to hold the view that space and time are phenomena, while at the same time thinking of them as abstract, ideal orders of existence. (shrink)

In several of his writings from the 1680s, Leibniz presents an argument for the claim that there are no determinate or precise shapes in things, and states that shape contains something imaginary a...