Leibniz: Metaphysics

In this article I interpret resilience and evolution in view of the philosophy of Leibniz. First, I discuss resilience as a substance’s or a monad’s “quantity of essence” — its “degree of perfection” — which I express as the quality of the Whole with respect to the sum of the qualities of the Parts. Then I discuss evolution, which I interpret here as the autopoietic Principle that sets Itself in motion and creates all reality, including Itself. This Principle may be (...) considered as a sort of ante-litteram metaphysical Darwinian Selection. My interpretations provide a different formulation for questions such as “why natural evolution evolves?” and “why is this the best of all possible worlds?” In this article I also provide a geometrical interpretation of a key aspect behind the “divine mathematics” of the autopoietic Principle. (shrink)

This paper argues that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions the substantial form was designed to answer – despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of the substantial (...) form. This examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning the soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to the substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of the substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding the substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science. -/- . (shrink)

Leibniz initially believed in the absoluteness of time and place, but later he changed his idea. His true and final view is that time and place are relative and subjective concepts, whereas Newton believed that they are absolute and have a real and objective existence independent of other phenomena. In his correspondence with Samuel Clark, he refers to the weak points of the views of Newton and Clark and presents several philosophical and theological arguments to reject them. Time and place (...) are treated in his philosophy ontologically, and their existence is relative. Epistemologically speaking, these concepts correspond to phenomena and depend on external phenomena and objects. From a psychological point of view, these concepts are formed in the mind through observing the relations among objective phenomena. Time and place are attributes of phenomena rather than monads or simple substances.In contrast to Newton's idea, the existence of an empty place or vacuum is impossible and in contradiction to Leibniz's accepted principles. He has presented some metaphysical and theological arguments on rejecting this issue in most of his works. (shrink)

As far as treatments of causation are concerned, the pre-Kantian 18th century German context has long been dismissed as a period of uniform and unrepentant Leibnizian dogmatism. While there is no question that discussions of issues relating to causation in this period inevitably took Leibniz as their point of departure, it is certainly not the case that the resulting positions were in most cases dogmatically, or in some cases even recognizably, Leibnizian. Instead, German theorists explored a range of positions regarding (...) the nature of causal powers, the appropriate systems to explain the observed agreement between the states of substances, and the ground of free actions, or so I will argue in this chapter. Focusing on these three issues, I will here sketch the development of the debates relating to causation and trace the evolution of positions among the philosophers within the so-called Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy as well as among its many opponents. (shrink)

Leibniz argues against Descartes’s conception of material substance based on considerations of unity. I examine a key premise of Leibniz’s argument, what I call the Plurality Thesis—the claim that matter (i.e. extension alone) is a plurality of parts. More specifically, I engage an objection to the Plurality Thesis stemming from what I call Material Monism—the claim that the physical world is a single material substance. I argue that Leibniz can productively engage this objection based on his view that matter is (...) discrete. The discreteness of matter provides two aspects of support for the Plurality Thesis. First, it indicates that the parts of matter do not share boundaries and are, therefore, independent in an important sense. Second, it indicates that the parts of matter are determinate and are, therefore, ontologically prior to the wholes they compose. (shrink)

Rosi Braidotti has recently argued that the emerging scholarship on posthumanism should employ that she calls nomadic thinking. Braidotti identifies Deleuze’s work on Spinoza as the genesis of posthumanist ontology, yet Deleuze’s claims about nomadic thinking or nomadology come from his work on Leibniz. I argue that for posthumanist thought to theorize subjectivity beyond the human, it must use nomadology to overcome ontology itself. To make my argument, I demonstrate that while Braidotti is correct about Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze, his (...) work on Leibniz is necessary to adequately conceptualize nomadology. I employ Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of the Thought-brain as a model for subjectivity that they claim goes beyond the subject itself. Accordingly, I also look at some of the recent scholarship on Deleuze and the brain to illustrate what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the Thought-brain and how it could be used for conceptualizing posthuman subjectivity. (shrink)

The concept of every real thing from all eternity contains the unavoidability of its existence before the divine decision. Thus every complete concept of a real thing contains the property of being such that the thing will exist if a created universe exists. Then a thing's existence cannot be external to its concept. There is bound to be more in the concept of something that exists than in that of "something" that does not-since existence is explained through the quidditative property (...) of being an essence that constitutes an integral part of the most perfect series of things. Such an essential, quidditative perfection explains the divine decision, and hence existence. Therefore, existence can be deduced from that essential perfection. The essence-as-such, the mere possible, contains something from which existence follows. What Leibniz never manages to explain is what distinguishes existence from the quidditative perfection it unavoidably stems from. (edited). (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

This paper aims to show that Deleuze’s ideas on space and extension are heavily in debt to Leibniz. The focus is on chapter five, ‘the Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’, of Difference and Repetition. Concepts such as ‘intensive magnitude’, ‘distance’, ‘order’ and most importantly ‘spatium’ are shown to have their origin in Leibniz’s philosophy. In order to do so, the article starts with Leibniz’s critique on Cartesian mechanics and how this leads Leibniz to a conception of space that goes beyond (...) the Cartesian concept of extension. The latter lacks difference, potentiality and individuality. Leibniz argues that the Cartesian homogeneous plenum should therefore be grounded in a deeper more substantial space: the spatium. Understood as such, space is not an absolute substance but a structure of relations between substances. Although Leibniz’s texts offer enough to understand this spatium, they do not explain how the genesis of extension out of space should be understood. It is on this point that Deleuze offers a fruitful interpretation of Leibniz by conceptualizing such a genesis in terms of difference. Extension is understood as a homogenization and externalization of the internal and pure differences in space. In the end, Leibniz helps us to understand Deleuze’s theory, while Deleuze offers us an enriching interpretation of Leibniz that succeeds where authors such as Yvon Belaval and Martial Gueroult have failed. (shrink)

Leibniz famously argues that there must be simple substances, since there are composites, and a composite is nothing but a collection of simples. I reconstruct Leibniz’s argument, showing that it relies on a commitment to mereological nihilism. I show further that Leibniz endorses mereological nihilism as early as the 1680s and offers both direct and indirect support for this commitment: indirect support via the notion of unity and direct support via the notion of persistence. I then assess the alignment of (...) Leibniz’s mereological nihilism with his other commitments during the 1680s, including his potential commitment to corporeal substances. I argue that any viable interpretation of Leibniz’s commitment to corporeal substances is compatible with mereological nihilism, which provides a new perspective both on Leibniz’s developing theory of substance and on his mature theory of simple substance. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between the views of Leibniz and Berkeley on the fundamental nature of the created universe. It argues that Leibniz concurs with Berkeley on three key points: that in the final analysis there are only perceivers and their contents (subjective idealism), that there are strictly speaking no material or corporeal substances, and that bodies or sensible things reduce to the contents of perceivers (phenomenalism). It then reconstructs his central argument for phenomenalism, which rests on his belief (...) in the infinite division of matter, his doctrine of the ideality of relations, and the traditional principle of the convertibility of being and unity. Finally, it explores Leibniz’s belief that a body having its being in one perceiver can be “founded” on other perceivers, and considers Berkeley’s reasons for opposing such a view. (shrink)

In the Theodicy, Leibniz argues against two impious conceptions of God—a God who makes arbitrary choices and a God who doesn’t make choices at all. Many interpret Leibniz as navigating these dangers by positing a kind of non-Spinozistic necessitarianism. I examine passages from the Theodicy which reject not only blind necessitarianism but necessitarianism altogether. Leibniz thinks blind necessitarianism is dangerous due to the conception of God it entails and the implications for morality. Non-Spinozistic necessitarianism avoids many of these criticisms. Leibniz (...) finds that even necessary actions should receive certain rewards and punishments as long as they necessarily lead to a change in future behavior. But Leibniz rejects even non-Spinozistic necessitarianism on the grounds that it is inconsistent with punitive justice. Whether Leibniz successfully avoids necessitarianism, it ought to be clear that he sees his own position as significantly distinct from necessitarianism and not just Spinozism. (shrink)

Leibniz and Kant were heirs of a biblical theistic tradition which viewed miraculous activity in the world as both possible and actual. But both were also deep explanatory rationalists about the natural world: more committed than your average philosophical theologian to its thoroughgoing intelligibility. These dual sympathies—supernaturalist religion and empirical rationalism—generate a powerful tension across both philosophers’ systems, one that is most palpable in their accounts of empirical miracles—that is, events in nature that violate one or more of the natural (...) laws. The primary goal of this chapter is to exhibit their respective efforts to resolve this tension, and to show how Kant’s noumenal ignorance doctrine allows him to set aside some key difficulties that Leibniz’s model leaves unresolved. The chapter concludes with the unorthodox suggestion that both systems leave conceptual space for the idea that finite free beings, rather than just God, can produce empirical miracles. (shrink)

Philosophers often rely on the notion of conceptual containment and apply mereological terminology when they talk about the parts or constituents of a complex concept. In this paper, I explore two historical approaches to this general notion. In particular, I reconstruct objections Bernard Bolzano puts forward against a criterion that played a prominent role in the history of philosophy and that was endorsed, among others, by Leibniz. According to this criterion, a concept that represents objects contains all and only the (...) concepts that represent properties the objects must have in order to be represented by the former concept. Bolzano offers several counterexamples and arguments against the criterion. I argue that while some of them presuppose a strongly mereological understanding of containment, which Leibniz is not committed to, one of them also succeeds without relying on demanding mereological principles. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between Locke and Leibniz's account of space and how this impacts on their understanding of possibility, and particularly practical choices between possibilities within a modal space. Using Borges' short story 'Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote' it argues that Locke's acquiescence to absolute space severely restricts his account of the power to do things. Leibniz's retention of relative space permits a much richer account of possible, yet he binds these worlds together under a universal set (...) of principles which are morally true in every possible world. He calls these morally impossible, echoing the Scholastic language of repugnance. 'Menard' is employed to critique this resort to universality, before an alternative possible truth structure is sketched as a response to the 'self-evident' truths defended by Leibniz. (shrink)

In the second edition of Hermann Cohen’s Kant’s Theory of Experience, he abandons the interpretation of Kant’s Anticipations of Perception that he gave in the first edition, in favourof a radically different one. On his early interpretation, the Anticipations is largely of psychological interest for its influence on, and continuing significance for, physiological psychology and psychophysics. But on his mature interpretation, it defends the superiority of a dynamic conception of nature over a mechanical conception. Further, on his early interpretation, Cohen (...) thought the Anticipations was not a central part of Kant’s critical theory of knowledge. But on his mature interpretation, he thinks it is absolutely central to that project. What is more, Cohen seems to have revised his interpretation in a relatively short period of time, in 1880-1. This paper argues that Cohen’s change in views about Kant’s Anticipations is explained by his reception of Leibniz in the very early 1880s, and specifically Cohen’s reception of Leibniz’s arguments against Descartes’ view that extension is the essence of matter. (shrink)

Saul Kripke may have argued that unicorns could not possibly exist, but if you’re personally unconvinced, you’d be in good company. When he wasn’t busy independently inventing infinitesimal calculus and devising his famous theodicy, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz found time to write about unicorns in what would become Protogaea.

I discuss an objection by Margaret Wilson against Robert Brandom’s interpretation of Leibniz’s account of perceptual distinctness. According to Brandom, Leibniz holds that (i) the relative distinctness of a perception is a function of its inferentially articulated content and (ii) apperception, or awareness, is explicable in terms of degrees of perceptual distinctness. Wilson alleges that Brandom confuses ‘external deducibility’ from a perceptual state of a monad to the existence of properties in the world, with ‘internally accessible content’ for the monad (...) in that state. Drawing on Leibniz, I develop a response to Wilson on Brandom’s behalf. (shrink)

This paper addresses some issues of Leibniz’s metaphysics to show the relationship between religion, God, and the conception of eternal truths, and with that to reveal that Leibniz’s philosophy is a coherent and intertwined whole. His idea of religion is set out briefly, then his metaphysics is analyzed, in particular creation and what are the eternal truths. The paper ends with a commentary on some quotations from the New essays that make evident that these truths require the existence of God. (...) // Se abordan algunas cuestiones de la metafísica leibniziana para mostrar el vínculo entre la religión, Dios y la concepción de las verdades eternas, y con ello poner de manifiesto que la filosofía de Leibniz es un todo engarzado y coherente. Se expone sucintamente su idea de religión, se analiza su metafísica, en particular la creación y lo que son las verdades eternas, y finalmente se comentan algunas citas de los Nuevos ensayos que evidencian que dichas verdades exigen la existencia de Dios. (shrink)

Durante su intercambio epistolar con Spinoza, Tschirnhaus defiende la imposibilidad de deducir la naturaleza de los cuerpos particulares a partir de la sola extensión. El motivo de esta objeción reside en su dificultad para desmarcarse de la concepción sustancial de los cuerpos como partes finitas de la extensión sostenida por Descartes. Esta dificultad inicial, sin embargo, queda ensombrecida por la intervención de Leibniz en un momento clave de la correspondencia que convertirá la disputa de carácter físico en una controversia teológica. (...) Este artículo demuestra que el problema metafísico detectado por Leibniz consiste en la afirmación radical del principio de plenitud contenida en la proposición 16 de la primera parte de la Ética y las consecuencias heréticas que de ésta se desprenden. El examen del papel que la crítica de Leibniz jugó en el desarrollo de la discusión permitirá leer bajo una nueva luz tanto la paradójica actitud de Tschirnhaus como las enigmáticas y elusivas respuestas de Spinoza. (shrink)

This essay proposes a new interpretation of a central, and yet overlooked, argument Leibniz offers against Descartes’s power-free ontology of the corporeal world. Appealing to considerations about the successiveness of motion, Leibniz attempts to show that the reality of motion requires force. It is often assumed that the argument is driven by concerns inspired by Zeno. Against such a reading, this essay contends that Leibniz’s argument is instead best understood against the background of an Aristotelian view of the priority of (...) real being over time. The essay also shows how this alternative interpretation can help to shed new light on the difference between Leibnizian forces and Aristotelian powers, as well as on Leibniz’s famous claim that accounting for force leads us beyond the mechanistic corporeal realm. (shrink)

This paper explores a PSR-connected trail leading from theistic idealism to a form of substance monism. In particular, I argue that the same style of argument available for a Leibnizian form of metaphysical idealism actually leads beyond idealism to something closer to Spinozistic monism. This path begins with a set of theological commitments about the nature and perfection of God that were widely shared among leading early modern philosophers. From these commitments, there arises an interesting case for metaphysical idealism, roughly (...) the thesis that only minds and mind-dependent states actually exist. However, I contend, that same theistic reasoning also leads to an idealist form of substance monism, the view that God is the only actual substance and that almost everything else is merely an intentional object in God’s mind. (shrink)

Se aborda la polémica entre Leibniz y Malebranche en torno a la relación entre las sustancias. Se plantean cuatro hipótesis para explicar esta interacción: la influencia física, la asistencia divina inmediata, la identidad y la armonía previa. Se explica la posición crítica de Leibniz respecto a las otras tres. En relación con la primera hipótesis Leibniz y Malebranche están de acuerdo en que no es viable. Se explican la crítica de Leibniz al ocasionalismo de Malebranche y al monismo sustancialista de (...) Spinoza. Y finalmente se analiza, desde la hipótesis de la armonía previa, el modo en que Leibniz aprovecha la disputa con el ocasionalismo, tanto en la versión de Malebranche como en la de Pierre Bayle, para reivindicar la autonomía de la razón en el ámbito de las causas segundas. En ello juegan un papel fundamental la noción de naturaleza de las cosas, el principio de diversidad y el principio de razón suficiente. (shrink)

Through the reconstruction of Leibniz's theory of the degrees of knowledge, this e-book investigates and explores the intrinsic relationship of imagination with space and time. The inquiry into this relationship defines the logic of imagination that characterizes both human and non-human animals, albeit differently, making them two different species of imaginative animals. -/- Lucia Oliveri explains how the emergence of language in human animals goes hand in hand with the emergence of thought and a different form of rationality constituted by (...) logical inferences based on identity and contradiction, principles that are out of reach of the imagination. The e-book concludes that the presence of innate principles in human animals transforms the way in which they sense-perceive the world, thereby constantly increasing the distinction between human and non-human animals. -/- Keywords: human and non-human animals, Leibniz and Locke on ideas, Leibniz on bodies, Leibniz on conceivability, Leibniz on degrees of knowledge, Leibniz on degrees of perception, Leibniz on innate ideas, Leibniz on modality, Leibniz on similarity and congruence, Leibniz on space and time, Leibniz’s philosophy of language, theory of types. (shrink)

Descartes y Leibniz figuran como pensadores opuestos en el ámbito de la filosofía moderna. Tras un período de influencia inicial, el pensador alemán habría sido un crítico severo de las tesis filosóficas del filósofo francés. Sin embargo, una lectura cuidadosa de las dispersas declaraciones leibnizianas a propósito de los afectos y su dimensión moral nos permitirán hacernos cargo de la distancia y cercanía entre el pensamiento de ambos. Para Descartes la felicidad está ligada a la voluntad, mientras que Leibniz será (...) más fiel a la tradición intelectualista aristotélica, aunque su concepción de las emociones es, en muchos sentidos, asombrosamente similar. (shrink)

Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue (...) that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined. (shrink)

This paper examines the Leibnizian influence in Deleuze's theory of the spatium. Leibniz's critique of Cartesian extension and Newtonian space leads him to a conception of space in terms of internal determination and internal difference. Space is thus understood as a structure of individual relations internal to substances. Making some Nietzschean corrections to Leibniz, Deleuze understands the spatium in terms of individuating differences instead of individual relations. Leibnizian space is thus transformed into a genetic space producing both extension (quantity) and (...) quality. (shrink)

Śrīgupta, a Buddhist philosopher in the Middle Way tradition, was born in Bengal in present-day India in the seventh century. He is best known for his Introduction to Reality with its accompanying auto-commentary,1 in which he presents the first Middle Way iteration of the influential "neither-one-nor-many argument."2 This antifoundationalist line of reasoning sets out to prove that nothing enjoys ontologically independent being.Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born some one thousand years later, in the city of Leipzig, situated on the outskirts of (...) European learning and thought. He is best known today for having co-invented the infinitesimal calculus, for his... (shrink)

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (henceforth ‘PSR’), everything has an explanation or sufficient reason. This paper addresses three questions. First, how continuous is the contemporary notion of grounding with the notion of sufficient reason endorsed by Spinoza, Leibniz, and other rationalists? In particular, does a PSR formulated in terms of ground retain the intuitive pull and power of the PSR endorsed by the rationalists? Second, to what extent can the PSR avoid the formidable traditional objections levelled against it (...) if it is formulated in terms of ground? And finally, how might historical discussion of the PSR shed light on the contemporary notion of grounding? (shrink)

We edited and translated a so far unpublished manuscript ("Sur la generation des insectes et d'autres petits animaux") drafted by Leibniz in 1714. The text is written on the same paper of the first draft of the "Monadology" and, as we show, there is a connection between these two texts of the late Leibniz, as far as in the "Monadology" , the rejection of the traditional theory of the spontaneous generation of small animals (like insects) is considered by Leibniz as (...) a posteriori confirmation of his preformist theory. In addition to that, this piece shows that Leibniz was deeply influenced by the experimental results in biology and natural sciences, and, especially, by the works of Italian scientits of the Galilean tradition, like Francesco Redi and Antonio Vallisneri. (shrink)

The 1695 publication of the “New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and of the Union which Exists between the Soul and the Body” in the June 27 and July 4 issues of the Parisian Journal des sçavans marks an important milestone in Leibniz’s philosophical trajectory. It presented the first comprehensive public presentation of his metaphysics as it had matured over the preceding decades, and it would spark many lively exchanges and debates between Leibniz and his philosophical (...) contemporaries in the decades to come. This chapter provides background regarding the text’s genesis and reception, and introduces its main philosophical themes. After highlighting some interpretative challenges raised by both the “New System’s” form and philosophical content, it goes on to explore two key elements of the metaphysical picture it advances: Leibniz’s account of individual substances, and his theory of the pre-established harmony between them. (shrink)

To explain why God is not the author of sin, despite grounding all features of the world, the early Leibniz marginalized the divine will and defined existence as harmony. These moves support each other. It is easier to nearly eliminate the divine will from creation if existence itself is something wholly intelligible, and easier to identify existence with an internal feature of the possibles if the divine will is not responsible for creation. Both moves, however, commit Leibniz to a necessitarianism (...) that is stronger than what prominent interpreters such as Robert Sleigh and Mogens Lærke have found in the early Leibniz, and stronger than the necessitarianism that threatens his later philosophy. I defend this reading of Leibniz and propose that some features of Leibniz’s later metaphysics, including his “striving possibles” doctrine, are an artifact of the effort to rescue the early theodicy from its unwelcome implications. (shrink)

Leibniz accepts causal independence, the claim that no created substance can causally interact with any other. And Leibniz needs causal independence to be true, since his well-known pre-established harmony is premised upon it. So, what is Leibniz’s argument for causal independence? Sometimes he claims that causal interaction between substances is superfluous. Sometimes he claims that it would require the transfer of accidents, and that this is impossible. But when Leibniz finds himself under sustained pressure to defend causal independence, those are (...) not the reasons that he marshals in its defense. Instead, deep into his long correspondence with Burchard de Volder, he gives a different sort of argument, one that has gone nearly unnoticed by commentators and has not yet been properly understood. In part, this is because the argument develops slowly over four years of correspondence. It emerges in early 1704, but it is formulated tersely and appears murky unless understood in light of Leibniz and De Volder’s tangled exchanges. There Leibniz argues that, on his distinctive ontology of an infinity of created substances, no two created substances could possibly causally interact, for roughly the same reasons that some Cartesians like De Volder deny interaction between minds and bodies on their substance dualist ontology. In this paper I draw out this lost argument, explain it and the metaphysics on which Leibniz builds it, and untangle Leibniz and De Volder’s exchanges concerning causation from which this argument results. (shrink)

I argue that Leibniz’s well-known Argument from Unity is equally an argument from plurality. I detail two main claims about plurality that drive the argument, and I provide evidence that they structure Leibniz’s argument from the late 1670s onwards. First, there is what I call Mereological Nihilism (i.e., the claim that a plurality cannot be made into a true unity by any available means). Second, there is what I call the Plurality Thesis (i.e., the claim that matter is a plurality (...) in need of unity in the first place). I suggest that the Plurality Thesis offers a general analysis of materiality that, in some sense, is the most important aspect of Leibniz’s argument. Finally, I connect these claims about plurality to the common 17th & 18th century commitment known as the actual parts doctrine. (shrink)

Leibniz often refers to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as something like a first principle. In some texts, however, he attempts to give positive arguments in its favor. I examine two such arguments, and find them wanting. The first argument has two defects. First, it is question-begging; and second, when the question-begging step is excised, the principle one can in fact derive is highly counter-intuitive. The second argument is valid, but has the defect of only reaching a nearly trivial (...) conclusion. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to explain how and why all human cognition depends on the body for Leibniz. I will show that there are three types of dependence: (a) the body is needed in order to supply materials, or content, for thinking; (b) the body is needed in order to give us the opportunity for the discovery of innate ideas; and (c) the body is needed in order to provide sensory notions as vehicles of thought. The third type (...) is intimately connected to the faculty of the imagination, which supplies the sensory vehicles of thought. Hence, the paper will also examine Leibniz’s account of that faculty and its operations. Before doing any of this, however, I will address the elephant in the room: Leibniz’s claim that mind and body do not interact at all, metaphysically speaking. The correspondence between mind and body is merely a matter of what he calls ‘pre-established harmony’. At first glance, this Leibnizian doctrine may suggest a radical disembodiment of all human cognition. Yet, I will argue that this is not the case and that, quite to the contrary, pre-established harmony requires that cognition is embodied in one important sense. (shrink)

Leibniz’s correspondence with Antoine Arnauld is one of the clearest and most comprehensive expressions of Leibniz’s philosophy in the so-called middle period. This chapter will explore the philosophical content of this correspondence. It will concentrate on four of the most central topics: (a) complete concepts and contingency, (b) substance and body, (c) causation, and (d) the special status of rational souls in God’s plan.

It is easy to get the impression that Newton and Leibniz do not see eye to eye on anything. Yet, as is so often the case, a closer look reveals that matters are much more complicated. Despite their disagreements, the two are frequently on the same side of central scientific and philosophical debates. This entry discusses some of the main agreements and disagreements between Newton and Leibniz, starting with their methodologies and then turning to their views on space, motion, and (...) gravitation. (shrink)

Monads, Composition, and Force: Ariadnean Threads through Leibniz’s Labyrinth, by ArthurRichard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. ix + 329.