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  1. Essays on Nonconceptual Content.York H. Gunther (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
  2. Emotion and Force.York H. Gunther - 2003 - In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 279--88.
    Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks (...)
     
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  3. The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion.York H. Gunther - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
  4. Content, Illusion, Partition.York H. Gunther - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.
    Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of (...)
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    Nonconceptuality and the Emotions.York H. Gunther - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 35:104-111.
    I present an argument for the existence of nonconceptual states. A nonconceptual state is an intentional state which does not require the bearer to possess all requisite concepts in order to represent the state. I frame the debate by outlining two constraints that an argument for nonconceptuality should meet. First, successful argument must present a platitude of concepts and illustrate that there are intentional states which both actually violate this platitude and explain behavior independently of conceptual states. This ensures that (...)
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  6. A Theory of Emotional Content.York H. Gunther - manuscript
    The revived interest in the emotions has generated much discussion of late. Analyses typically begin by considering the various features that are involved in emotional experience generally, e.g., feeling, physiology, cognition, and behavior. This is often followed by explanations about the role of emotions in rationality, moral psychology, ethics, and/or society, as well as examinations of specific emotions like pride, jealousy, love, or guilt. Overall, the topic has been approached from a diversity of perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and (...)
     
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  7. Nonconceptual Content: A Critique and Defense.York H. Gunther - 1999 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    In the dissertation I provide a framework for assessing arguments intended to establish nonconceptual thought and for presenting my own case based on the emotions. Drawing on the work of Frege, I motivate three principles for individuating conceptual thought which I derive from his notion of sense. For a thought to be conceptual, I claim, it must be distinct from its force, be individuated by its cognitive significance, and determine its reference or correctness conditions. The nonconceptualist's objective, I contend, is (...)
     
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  8. Perceptual Content and the Subpersonal.York H. Gunther - 1995 - Conference 6 (1):31-45.
     
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