This article is divided into three sections. In the first and second, I examine Sartorio’s account of the causal structure of the famous Thirsty Traveler thought experiment. I argue that this account does not withstand critical scrutiny. In the third, I turn to a novel kind of moral luck that Sartorio uses the Thirsty Traveler to expose. I expand the scope of my argument to look also at other recently proposed categories of moral luck. I argue that these proposals are (...) overhasty. (shrink)

Straipsnyje tyrinėjamos dvi akrasijos sampratos ir jų santykis su atsakomybės priskyrimu Douglaso Husako baudžiamosios atsakomybės teorijoje. Nuo Platono Protagoro laikų akrasijos problema filosofijoje glaudžiai siejama su moralinio žinojimo klausimu. Pasitelkiant Antikos bei krikščioniškajai etikai itin reikšmingus tekstus, taip pat šiuolaikinius akratiško elgesio tyrinėjimus, straipsnyje išryškinama kita – vidiniu konfliktu paremta akrasijos samprata. Husako teorijoje taikoma akrasijos samprata akcentuoja moralinį žinojimą-nežinojimą. Tačiau jos prielaidų šaltinis yra ne Antika, o šiuolaikiniai moralinės atsakomybės priskyrimo skeptikai, nors paties Husako teorija nėra skeptinė. Darbe išryškinami (...) esminiai Husako teorijos trūkumai. Šie trūkumai atsiremia į Husako akratiško veikėjo sampratą ir kaip tokiam veikėjui priskiriama atsakomybė. Jų nagrinėjimas leidžia parodyti vidiniu konfliktu grįstos akrasijos sampratos pranašumus konstruojant neskeptinę baudžiamosios atsakomybės teoriją. (shrink)

Nietzsche's ethics is basically an ethics of virtue. In his own unique way, and in accordance with his extra-moral view of life, Nietzsche recovers and re-appropriates certain virtues – notably pagan, aristocratic virtues – as part of his project to reconceptualise (‘rehabilitate') the virtues in terms of virtù (virtuosity and vitality), to which he also refers as his ‘moraline-free' conception of the virtues. The virtue of generosity (in the sense of magnanimity) plays a central role in Nietzschean ethics. According to (...) Nietzsche, the truly noble or virtuous person is one who lives beyond resentment and feelings of remorse and guilt. He lives his life from the fullness and plenitude of his own being and what he is able to bestow on others. Nietzsche seeks to rekindle and rehabilitate the aristocratic ‘pathos of distance' as the true origin of ethical life. This pathos of distance basically emanates from self-respect: ‘The noble soul has reverence for itself' (1974b: §287). For Nietzsche, this means that one should realize the greatest multiplicity of drives and form-giving forces in oneself, in the most tension-fraught but ‘controlled' manner. This control, this imposing a form on oneself without neglecting the multiplicity in oneself, is a creative, artistic activity. Nietzsche also refers to this as a process of transforming the self into a work of art, of giving style to one's own existence. Thus we free ourselves from guilt, resentment and the rage against contingency. It is of the utmost importance for Nietzsche that one should attain satisfaction with oneself, for ‘only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold. Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight.' (1974a: §290). To attain satisfaction with oneself ultimately means to affirm life in its totality. This implies a life beyond resentment, i.e. a life that is characterised by generosity or magnanimity ( megalopsychia, magnanimitas ), which is for Nietzsche the ‘crown' of all the virtues. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (1) 2007: pp. 17-30. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous nous efforçons de présenter synthétiquement la philosophie d’Andre Comte-Sponville. Pour ce faire, nous nous intéressons d’abord à la distinction capitale qu’il effectue entre valeur et vérité. Refusant à la fois le dogmatisme (oú la vérité vaut) et la sophistique (oú la valeur est vraie), André Comte-Sponville prône une position cynique pour laquelle la vérité est sans valeur et les valeurs sont sans vérité. Ensuite, délaissant la théorie pour la pratique, nous évoquons une autre distinction, tout aussi (...) importante, qui oppose l’ethique et la morale. L’etude conjointe de ces deux distinctions, théorique et pratique, nous permet alors de montrer que la philosophie de Comte-Sponville ne saurait se réduire à ce que Luc Ferry appelle de la “moraline”, à savoir du moralisme médiatique, mais qu’elle exige au contraire une vertu exigeante et austère, loin des bons sentiments dont on l’affuble trop souvent en France.This article will seek to present synthetically Andre Comte-Sponville’s philosophy. It will first consider the capital distinction he establishes between value and truth. Refusing both dogmatism (where truth is valued) and sophistry (where value is truth), Andre Comte-Sponville advocates a cynical position for which truth has no value, and values are without truth. Then, moving from theory to practice, we will bring up another distinction - just as important - which opposes ethics and morals. The combined study of both these distinctions, theoretical and practical, allows to show that Comte-Sponville’s philosophy cannot be reduced to what Luc Ferry calls “moraline”, that is, media moralism, but that it requires on the contrary a demanding and austere virtue, far from the good sentiments that are too often attributed to it in France. (shrink)

Que dire à des jeunes de vingt ans pour leur conduite dans ce monde qui part à la dérive? La civilisation s'effondre, les valeurs s'inversent, la culture se rétrécit comme une peau de chagrin, les livres comptent moins que les écrans, l'école n'apprend plus à penser mais à obéir au politiquement correct, la famille explosée, décomposée, recomposée se retrouve souvent composée d'ayants droit égotistes et narcissiques. De nouveaux repères surgissent, qui contredisent les anciens : le racisme revient sous forme de (...) racialisme, la phallocratie sous prétexte de néo-féminisme, l'antisémitisme sous couvert d'antisionisme, le fascisme sous des allures de progressisme, le nihilisme sous les atours de la modernité, l'antispécisme et le transhumanisme passent pour des humanismes alors que l'un et l'autre travaillent à la mort de l'homme, l'écologisme se pare des plumes anticapitalistes bien qu'il soit le navire amiral du capital--il y a de quoi perdre pied. J'ai rédigé une série de lettres à cette jeune génération pour lui raconter les racines culturelles de notre époque : elles ont pour sujet la moraline, le néo-féminisme, le décolonialisme, l'islamo-gauchisme, l'antifascisme, la déresponsabilisation, la créolisation, l'antisémitisme, l'écologisme, l'art contemporain, le transhumanisme, l'antispécisme. L'une d'elles explique en quoi consiste l'art d'être français : d'abord ne pas être dupe, ensuite porter haut l'héritage du libre examen de Montaigne, du rationalisme de Descartes, de l'hédonisme de Rabelais, de l'ironie de Voltaire, de l'esprit de finesse de Marivaux, de la politique de Hugo."--Back cover. (shrink)

Nowadays ethics plays a vital role in numerous professions. Due to social requirements and technical advances, changes in the accreditation rules in legal, economic, medical and engineering education have emerged in many countries, often requiring the inclusion of an ethics requirement in such professional programmes. In this work, the authors demonstrate that such changes are absolutely necessary in the legal profession in Lithuania. Specifically, the record low level of prestige of the judiciary and lawyers in the Lithuanian society and the (...) fact that lawyers are often accused of legal nihilism, clannish behaviour, and protectionism, demand that legal ethics assumes a far greater role in Lithuanian legal education. It is necessary to stress that the topic of lawyers’ ethical violations and the consequences of such violations is discussed in the society in only in a fragmentary, and not transparent manner; moreover, the significance of ethics in the education and training of lawyers has not been properly evaluated either. Especially having in mind Lithuania’s Soviet heritage (during most of the Communist era there was almost no education on those issues), it becomes obvious that legal ethics must be continuously stressed in the legal profession’s education and development. The importance and relevance of this topic is primarily determined by the current evaluation of lawyers in Lithuania, which shows that lawyers do not fulfil the expectations of the society. This raises a question whether law graduates indeed acquire this system of ethical values as part of the process of obtaining the knowledge and skills that are necessary for a modern lawyer. While analysing the Lithuanian legal documents governing the requirements for legal studies, it has been noticed that a course in legal ethics or lawyer’s professional responsibility is not compulsory either in the qualification requirements for judges, or in the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 20 February 2008 on legal education for those who want to assume the position of a judge according to the order of law. In the description of legal study programmes, courses on professional ethics are designated as an optional non-legal subject, which is quite different from the legal education systems of other countries, where this type of course is compulsory for future lawyers. Even if this course is taught at Lithuanian higher education establishments, it is limited to the analysis of cases and legal regulation. Insufficient attention to this issue obviously creates the erroneous impression that it is of secondary importance for a lawyer. It should be noted that legal ethical standards, the development of lawyers’ value systems and other problematic questions related to legal ethics have not attracted attention of the Lithuanian scholars either. Therefore, this is a question of the utmost importance for legal education and requires additional research. In global educational and other academic literature, much is being discussed about the methods of teaching ethics, and the place of ethical subjects in study programmes and assessment. It is well worth supporting the research on the development of lawyers’ value systems, in that the lack of such values may influence the evaluation of the practicing lawyers’ satisfaction with their job, self-confidence and belief in the importance of their profession. Obtaining social-ethical attitudes and perspectives helps future lawyers gain more trust in their professional identity and the correctness of their professional work. The main conclusions drawn from the research are the following: (1) the university can and needs to contribute to the development of students’ value systems and this is one of the most important content requirements within the legal study programmes; (2) while teaching ethics, the primary focus must be not on the legal acts regulating ethics, which are changing over time, but on the aim of helping that students themselves have an increased sense of selfawareness and sensitivity to ethical issues in law practice, recognise and understand ethical dilemmas arising in the law, recognise the dominant attitudes in the society towards the role of a lawyer and motivate them to reconsider and discuss the value bases of such attitudes and their change; (3) a course on legal ethics – no matter how perfect it would be – is not the only way to develop a personal value system. In this context, the importance of liberal arts education should be accentuated. Given the research conducted, there is a clear link between the development of moral awareness and the person’s education in general. (shrink)