"X" means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics

Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-231 (1994)
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Abstract

In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a modified reading of one of Fodor's conditions and proposes adding a new condition to the theory. We show that neither the modified reading nor the additional condition saves the asymmetric causal dependency approach to naturalized semantics.

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Author Profiles

Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Fred Adams
University of Delaware

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A structuralist theory of phenomenal intentionality.Ben White - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation.Dennis W. Stampe - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):42-63.
Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Russell Trenholme - 1994 - Noûs 28 (2):241-252.

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