No bare particulars

Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41 (2012)
Abstract
There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence
Keywords Bare particulars  Thin particulars  Substratum  Bundle theory
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References found in this work BETA
Edwin B. Allaire (1965). Another Look at Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):16 - 21.
Edwin B. Allaire (1963). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 14 (1-2):1 - 8.
William P. Alston (1954). Particulars--Bare and Qualified. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (2):253-258.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jesse M. Mulder (2013). The Essentialist Inference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):755-769.
Similar books and articles
Richard Brian Davis (2003). 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
Timothy Pickavance (2009). In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
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