Strategic behavior and counterfactuals

Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an equilibrium will be attained. In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs. In this case it becomes necessary to explicitly model the process of belief formation. This model attributes to the players a theory of counterfactuals which they use in restricting the set of possible equilibria. If it were possible to attribute to the players the same theory of counterfactuals, then the players'' beliefs would eventually converge.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,503

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
140 (#131,592)

6 months
13 (#189,362)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Cristina Bicchieri
University of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
Methodological rules as conventions.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (4):477-495.
AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence.Raúl Carnota & Ricardo Rodríguez - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 1--42.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

View all 38 references / Add more references