Say reports, assertion events and meaning dimensions

Abstract

In this paper, we study the parameters that come into play when assessing the truth conditions of say reports and contrast them with belief attributions. We argue that these conditions are sensitive in intricate ways to the connection between the interpretation of the complement of say and the properties of the reported speech act. There are three general areas this exercise is relevant to, besides the immediate issue of understanding the meaning of say: (i) the discussion shows the need to go beyond the simplest view of propositional attitudes, which treats them as restricted quantifiers over worlds; (ii) the complex connections that must exist between the say report and its source speech act show that one has to be able to differentiate between various layers of meaning for the antecedent sentences; (iii) finally, this paper is a small step towards a typology of propositional attitudes that allows us to uncover the complex web of relationships that grammatical mood is sensitive to.

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2009-01-28

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Citations of this work

Revisionist reporting.Kyle Blumberg & Harvey Lederman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):755-783.
Weak speech reports.Martín Abreu Zavaleta - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2139-2166.
Free choice of alternatives.Anamaria Fălăuş - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (2):121-173.
Quantifier particles and compositionality.Anna Szabolcsi - 2013 - Proceedings of the 19th Amsterdam Colloquium.

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