Abstract

Utilitarianism is the view that those acts are right that tend to maximize utility; those acts are wrong that tend to produce the reverse. By utility is intended happiness. According to Bernard Williams, utilitarianism does not recognize the importance of individual character and personal relationships in moral experience. This fault is most salient in the utilitarian demand that we treat our family and friends, those with whom we have special relationships, impartially when we act to maximize utility. Those who are the beneficiaries of utilitarian provisions lose their identities as defined by their personal relationships and thus lose any special consideration that may accrue from their personal relationships. Personal relations make up what Williams calls ground projects. Ground projects are those projects that constitute one's character or identity and give life meaning. Utilitarianism, in demanding that we treat those with whom we have special relationships impartially in every case, alienates us from that which gives our lives meaning. This dissertation attempts to counter Williams' charge against utilitarianism. Following a schema employed by Samuel Scheffler, I consider the replies utilitarians can employ to rebut Williams' charge. By way of analysis, exposition, and example I argue that indirect utilitarianism understood under the practice conception of rules does not systematically undermine the personal identities of agents as Williams claims