Reductionism about persons; and what matters
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58 (1998)
| Abstract | This paper's ?I examines Derek Parfit's main, metaphysical, argument for reductionism about personal identity. ?II considers three possible ethical arguments for reductionism, and suggests a new approach to the question of what matters about personal identity which has to do with the notion of an ethical narrative | |||||||||
| Keywords | Metaphysics Personal Identity Reductionism Parfit, D | |||||||||
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