Distinguishing the 'ought' from the 'rational'

Philosophia 15 (3):251-270 (1985)
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Epistemic indolence.Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):38-56.
The Social Source of Reason.Kurt Baier - 1978 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51 (6):707 - 733.

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