Is Imperative Inference Impossible? The Argument from Permissive Presuppositions
In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor (2012)
| Abstract | Standard definitions of validity are designed to preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion. However, it seems possible to construct arguments that contain sentences in the imperative mood. Such sentences are incapable of being true or false, so the standard definitions cannot capture the validity of these imperative arguments. Bernard Williams offers an argument that imperative inference is impossible: two imperatives will always have different permissive presuppositions, so a speaker will have to change his mind before uttering a second imperative, and so imperatives cannot ever be accumulated into a set of premises. I offer four objections to Williams’ argument: (1) Permissive presuppositions are analogous to conversational implicature, and so should be ignored when formulating imperative arguments. (2) There are other valid argument forms, which Williams does not consider, that do not suffer from different permissive presuppositions. (3) There are explanations for the change in permissive presuppositions in Williams’ example other than a change of mind, so the different permissive presuppositions do not have to prevent accumulation. Finally, (4) Williams accepts enough logical relations between imperatives (contradiction and a form of negation) for a definition of a valid imperative inference to follow naturally. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Validity Imperatives Permissive Presuppositions | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesPeter B. M. Vranas (2010). In Defense of Imperative Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1).
Peter B. M. Vranas (2012). New Foundations for Imperative Logic Iii: A General Definition of Argument Validity. Manuscript in Preparation.
Stephen P. Engstrom (2009). The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Harvard University Press.
Randolph C. Wheeler (2008). Kantian Imperatives and Phenomenology's Original Forces: Kant's Imperatives and the Directives of Contemporary Phenomenology. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
Josh Parsons (2012). Cognitivism About Imperatives. Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
Josep Macià (2002). Presuposicion Y Significado Expresivo. Theoria 17 (3):499-513.
Josh Parsons (2013). Command and Consequence. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):61-92.
Rosja Mastop (2011). Imperatives as Semantic Primitives. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (4):305-340.
Colin Klein (2012). Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
Anna Brożek (2011). Performatives and Imperatives. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (2):17-34.
Jeremy Schwartz (2010). Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives? European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):84-107.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-06-19Total downloads2 ( #232,382 of 549,066 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,066 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
