Cognitivism about imperatives

Analysis 72 (1):49-54 (2012)
Abstract
Cognitivism about imperatives is the thesis that sentences in the imperative mood are truth-apt: have truth values and truth conditions. This allows cognitivists to give a simple and powerful account of consequence relations between imperatives. I argue that this account of imperative consequence has counterexamples that cast doubt on cognitivism itself
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Citations of this work BETA
Nate Charlow (2014). Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.
Josh Parsons (2013). Command and Consequence. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):61-92.
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