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Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual Justification
Logos and Episteme 7 (2):215-219 (2016)
Abstract
James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.Links
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References found in this work
Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1981 - In David Zaret (ed.), Review of Thomas S. Kuhn The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Duke University Press. pp. 320--39.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
In defence of the value free ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk.Matthew J. Brown - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.
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