Can Consent be Presumed?

Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3):295-307 (2011)
Opt-out systems of postmortal organ procurement are often referred to as ‘presumed consent’ systems. A presumption directs us, in a case in which no compelling evidence is available to hold that P, nevertheless to proceed as if P were true, unless there is sufficient evidence that it is false. It is recommended to presume consent in this case, because, in the absence of registered objections of the deceased, it is held to be more probable that she consented than that she did not. Whether this suggestion makes sense, however, turns out to depend on the proper interpretation of the concept of ‘consent’. On a mental state conception of consent we are allowed to presume it if we have reason to suppose the deceased to have been in favour of donation. However, we should rather understand consent to be a public action of authorisation. On that view consent cannot be presumed, and the opt-out systems as we presently know them on the European continent and elsewhere do not satisfy the requirement that the deceased should have consented to the removal of his organs
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2011.00524.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,664
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Michael B. Gill (2004). Presumed Consent, Autonomy, and Organ Donation. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 (1):37 – 59.
Eric Chwang (2009). A Defense of Subsequent Consent. Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):117-131.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

51 ( #94,429 of 1,902,889 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #219,519 of 1,902,889 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.