Is empirical imagination a constraint on adaptationist theory construction?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):515-516 (2002)
Abstract
Andrews et al. present a form of instrumental adaptationism that is designed to test the hypothesis that a given trait is an adaptation. This epistemological commitment aims to make clear statements about behavioural natural kinds. The instrumental logic is sound, but it is the limits of our empirical imagination that can cause problems for theory construction.
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