A defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics

Synthese 112 (2):233-246 (1997)
This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrödinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory was that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected.
Keywords History & Philosophy Of Science   Bell Theorem   Causality   Antirealism
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004932911141
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Richard Corry (2015). Retrocausal Models for EPR. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 49:1-9.

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