Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality

Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme (1983)
Abstract
Sour Grapes aims to subvert orthodox theories of rational choice through the study of forms of irrationality. Dr Elster begins with an analysis of the notation of rationality, to provide the background and terms for the subsequent discussions, which cover irrational behaviour, irrational desires and irrational belief. These essays continue and complement the arguments of Jon Elster's earlier book, Ulysses and the Sirens. That was published to wide acclaim, and Dr Elster shows the same versatility here in drawing on philosophy, political and social theory, decision-theory, economics and psychology, as well as history and literature.
Keywords Irrationalism (Philosophy  Rationalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $18.07 used (63% off)   $34.99 new (28% off)   $41.52 direct from Amazon (14% off)    Amazon page
Call number B824.2.E45 1983
ISBN(s) 0521313686   9780521313681
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,337
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Daniel M. Haybron (2005). On Being Happy or Unhappy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):287–317.
Suzy Killmister (2013). Autonomy and False Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):513-531.

View all 56 citations

Similar books and articles
Peter Stone (2003). The Impossibility of Rational Politics? Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):239-263.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

62 ( #22,998 of 1,096,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #37,677 of 1,096,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.