Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality

Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme (1983)
Sour Grapes aims to subvert orthodox theories of rational choice through the study of forms of irrationality. Dr Elster begins with an analysis of the notation of rationality, to provide the background and terms for the subsequent discussions, which cover irrational behaviour, irrational desires and irrational belief. These essays continue and complement the arguments of Jon Elster's earlier book, Ulysses and the Sirens. That was published to wide acclaim, and Dr Elster shows the same versatility here in drawing on philosophy, political and social theory, decision-theory, economics and psychology, as well as history and literature.
Keywords Irrationalism (Philosophy  Rationalism
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Call number B824.2.E45 1983
ISBN(s) 0521313686   9780521313681
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Michiru Nagatsu (2015). Social Nudges: Their Mechanisms and Justification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):481-494.
Elizabeth Barnes (2009). Disability and Adaptive Preference. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):1-22.

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