Synthese 150 (2):281-325 (2006)
|Abstract||The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.|
|Keywords||Content First Person Intention Metaphysics Methodology Representation|
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