Narveson on Liberty and Equality

At issue with Narveson is not the independence of persons, but an extreme form of ownership. Many people could be more independent with ownership of a moderate kind. All Narveson’s arguments depend on presupposing that extreme ownership has a special moral status
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DOI 10.5840/ijap201125223
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Peter Vallentyne (2011). Equal Negative Liberty and Welfare Rights. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):237-41.
Jan Narveson (1986). Equality and Liberty. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (2):192-195.

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