Moral ambition

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):285-299 (2009)
Abstract
The paper opens with an account of moral ambition which, it argues, is both a coherent ideal and an admirable trait. It closes with a discussion of some of the ways in which this trait might differ from traditional virtues such as temperance, courage, or benevolence
Keywords ambition  virtue  vice  second-order virtue
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel A. Dombrowski (1989). Ambition. Journal of Social Philosophy 20 (3):130-137.

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