Moral ambition

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):285-299 (2009)
The paper opens with an account of moral ambition which, it argues, is both a coherent ideal and an admirable trait. It closes with a discussion of some of the ways in which this trait might differ from traditional virtues such as temperance, courage, or benevolence
Keywords ambition  virtue  vice  second-order virtue
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802215596
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References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.
Thomas Hurka (1993). Perfectionism. Oxford University Press.

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