Hume's Scepticism and Realism

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309 (2012)
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Abstract

In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in the existence of Real entities. The defended reading is thus a sceptical and Realist interpretation of Hume. As such, it belongs to the class of what can be called no-single-Hume interpretations (Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L. M. Baxter), by contrast to single-Hume readings, which include Realist (naturalist, New Humean) and the traditional Reid-Green interpretation (i.e. Hume believes that there are no Real entities). Hume's distinction between the domains of philosophy and everyday life, which is argued to be epistemological, is employed in order to reconcile his scepticism with his naturalism and constructive science of human nature. The article pays special attention to the too much neglected second profound argument against the senses in Part 1, Section 12 of Hume's first Enquiry and the corresponding argument in Section 4, Part 4, Book 1 of the Treatise

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Jani Hakkarainen
Tampere University

Citations of this work

Hume.Don Garrett - 2015 - New York: Routledge.
Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
Empiricism and Relationism Intertwined: Hume and Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity.Matias Slavov - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (2):247-263.
Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.

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References found in this work

Cognition and commitment in Hume's philosophy.Don Garrett - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A progress of sentiments: reflections on Hume's Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Hume.Don Garrett - 2015 - New York: Routledge.
A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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