Compatibilism, determinism, and the identity theory
Inquiry 32 (March):49-54 (1989)
| Abstract | Two issues are raised with regard to Ted Honderich's A Theory of Determinism. First, regarding the relation between a token identity theory of mental and physical events and Honderich's ?psychoneural union theory?, it is suggested that a token identity theory would serve Honderich's purposes while securing a simpler ontology. Second, it is argued that there is a substantive philosophical issue dividing compatibilists and incompatibilists on the question of whether persons possess free will, contrary to Honderich's contention that the compatibilist and incompatibilist differ only in responsive attitude | |||||||||
| Keywords | Compatibilism Determinism Identity Metaphysics Honderich, T | |||||||||
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Galen Strawson (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.
Ted Honderich (forthcoming). Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.
Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Ted Honderich (2002). Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1989). Honderich on Mental Events and Psychoneural Laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.
Richard Duble (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:305-309.
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