Problemas del empirismo en la filosofia de la mente
| Abstract | Experience of mental states becomes central as soon as we attempt to construe a science of the mind. Mental states appear irreducible to physical states in as far as they are neither public nor computable. From an epistemological point of view mental states are peculiar in that we have no knowledge proper to them, we simply have them. From the point of view of our experience, there are reasons to reject the physicalist explanation as well as the intentionalist account and also to reject the reducibility of mental states to brain states. Two different forms of experience are relevant: direct experience of one's own mental states and indirect experience of other people's through their behavior and speech. | |||||||||
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