Logical Form: Classical Conception and Recent Challenges

Philosophy Compass 1 (3):303-316 (2006)
The term ‘logical form’ has been called on to serve a wide range of purposes in philosophy, and it would be too ambitious to try to survey all of them in a single essay. Instead, I will focus on just one conception of logical form that has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, and in particular in the philosophical study of linguistic meaning. This is what I will call the classical conception of logical form. The classical conception, as I will present it in section 1, has (either explicitly or implicitly) shaped a great deal of important philosophical work in semantic theory. But it has come under fire in recent decades, and in sections 2 and 3 I will discuss two of the recent challenges that I take to be most interesting and significant
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00017.x
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Jason Stanley (2000). Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.

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