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Profile: Terence Parsons (University of California, Los Angeles)
  1.  92 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1969). Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic. Philosophical Review 78 (1):35-52.
  2.  81 DLs
    Terence D. Parsons (1981). Frege's Hierarchies of Indirect Senses and the Paradox of Analysis. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):37-58.
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  3.  78 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1986). Why Frege Should Not Have Said "The Concept Horse is Not a Concept". History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):449 - 465.
    Frege held various views about language and its relation to non-linguistic things. These views led him to the paradoxical-sounding conclusion that "the concept horse is NOT a concept." A key assumption that led him to say this is the assumption that phrases beginning with the definite article "the" denote objects, not concepts. In sections I-III this issue is explained. In sections IV-V Frege's theory is articulated, and it is shown that he was incorrect in thinking that this theory led to (...)
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  4.  76 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1967). Grades of Essentialism in Quantified Modal Logic. Noûs 1 (2):181-191.
  5.  76 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1982). Are There Nonexistent Objects? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (4):365 - 371.
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  6.  74 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1982). Fregean Theories of Fictional Objects. Topoi 1 (1-2):81-87.
  7.  58 DLs
    Peter W. Woodruff & Terence D. Parsons (1997). Indeterminancy of Identity of Objects and Sets. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):321-348.
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  8.  58 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2001). Bhartrhari on What Cannot Be Said. Philosophy East and West 51 (4):525-534.
    Bhartṛhari claims that certain things cannot be signified--for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartṛhari's claim about signification can be validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the thatness of the signification relation can be signified. Bhartṛhari also (...)
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  9.  48 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1989). The Progressive in English: Events, States and Processes. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (2):213 - 241.
    This paper has two goals. The first is to formulate an adequate account of the semantics of the progressive aspect in English: the semantics of Agatha is making a cake, as opposed to Agatha makes a cake. This account presupposes a version of the so-called Aristotelian classification of verbs in English into EVENT, PROCESS and STATE verbs. The second goal of this paper is to refine this classification so as to account for the infamous category switch problem, the problem of (...)
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  10.  47 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1996). What is an Argument? Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):164-185.
  11.  47 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2000). Underlying States and Time Travel. In Achille Varzi, James Higginbotham & Fabio Pianesi (eds.), Speaking of Events. Oxford University Press
    I begin by sketching a theory about the semantics of verbs in event sentences, and the evidence on which that theory is based. In the second section, I discuss the evidence for extending that theory to state sentences, including copulative sentences with adjectives and nouns; the evidence for this extension of the theory is not very good. In the third section, I discuss new evidence based on considerations of talk about time travel; that evidence is apparently quite good. I conclude (...)
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  12.  47 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2000). Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics. Clarendon Press.
    Terence Parsons presents a lively and controversial study of philosophical questions about identity. Because many puzzles about identity remain unsolved, some people believe that they are questions that have no answers and that there is a problem with the language used to formulate them. Parsons explores a different possibility: that such puzzles lack answers because of the way the world is (or because of the way the world is not). He claims that there is genuine indeterminacy of identity in the (...)
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  13.  44 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2008). Things That Are Right with the Traditional Square of Opposition. Logica Universalis 2 (1):3-11.
    . The truth conditions that Aristotle attributes to the propositions making up the traditional square of opposition have as a consequence that a particular affirmative proposition such as ‘Some A is not B’ is true if there are no Bs. Although a different convention than the modern one, this assumption remained part of centuries of work in logic that was coherent and logically fruitful.
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  14.  42 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1995). Meinongian Semantics Generalized. Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:145-161.
    It is tempting to think that Meinong overlooked the "specific/nonspecific" distinction. For example, 'I am looking for a grey horse' may either mean that there is a specific horse I am looking for (e.g. one I lost), or just that I am grey-horse-seeking. The former reading, and not the latter, requires for its truth that there be a grey horse. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether it is defensible to maintain Meinong's theory here: to take nonspecific reading (...)
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  15.  42 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1984). Assertion, Denial, and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.
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  16.  41 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1978). Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties, Meinong, and Leibniz. Noûs 12 (2):137-151.
  17.  41 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1973). Tense Operators Versus Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophy 70 (18):609-610.
  18.  38 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1975). A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:73-86.
    This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
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  19.  38 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1990). True Contradictions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):335 - 353.
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  20.  38 DLs
    Terence Parsons, The Traditional Square of Opposition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry traces the historical development of the Square of Opposition, a collection of logical relationships traditionally embodied in a square diagram. This body of doctrine provided a foundation for work in logic for over two millenia. For most of this history, logicians assumed that negative particular propositions ("Some S is not P") are vacuously true if their subjects are empty. This validates the logical laws embodied in the diagram, and preserves the doctrine against modern criticisms. Certain additional principles ("contraposition" (...)
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  21.  37 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1979). The Methodology of Nonexistence. Journal of Philosophy 76 (11):649-662.
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  22.  35 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1993). On Denoting Propositions and Facts. Philosophical Perspectives 7:441-460.
  23.  35 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1987). Entities Without Identity. Philosophical Perspectives 1:1-19.
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  24.  34 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1974). A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics. Journal of Philosophy 71 (16):561-580.
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  25.  33 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1994). Anaphoric Pronouns in Very Late Medieval Supposition Theory. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (5):429 - 445.
    This paper arose from an attempt to determine how the very late medieval1 supposition theorists treated anaphoric pronouns, pronouns whose significance is derivative from their antecedents. Modern researches into pronouns were stimulated in part by the problem of "donkey sentences" discussed by Geach 1962 in a section explaining what is wrong with medieval supposition theory. So there is some interest in seeing exactly what the medieval account comes to, especially if it turns out, as I suspect, to work as well (...)
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  26.  30 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1970). Various Extensional Notions of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 21 (5):65 - 74.
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  27.  29 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1967). Extensional Theories of Ontological Commitment. Journal of Philosophy 64 (14):446-450.
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  28.  28 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1970). Some Problems Concerning the Logic of Grammatical Modifiers. Synthese 21 (3-4):320 - 334.
    This paper consists principally of selections from a much longer work on the semantics of English. It discusses some problems concerning how to represent grammatical modifiers (e.g. slowly in x drives slowly) in a logically perspicuous notation. A proposal of Reichenbach's is given and criticized; then a new theory (apparently discovered independently by myself, Romain Clark, and Richard Montague and Hans Kamp) is given, in which grammatical modifiers are represented by operators added to a first-order predicate calculus. Finally some problems (...)
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  29.  27 DLs
    Stephen Barney, Wendy Lewis, Calvin Normore & Terence Parsons (1997). On the Properties of Discourse: A Translation of Tractatus de Proprietatibus Sermonum (Author Anonymous). Topoi 16 (1):77-93.
  30.  23 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1982). What Do Quotation Marks Name? Frege's Theories of Quotations and That-Clauses. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):315 - 328.
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  31.  22 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2013). Missing Modes of Supposition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):1-24.
  32.  21 DLs
    Gareth Matthews, Calvin Normore & Terence Parsons (1997). Introduction. Topoi 16 (1):1-6.
  33.  19 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1979). Referring to Nonexistent Objects. Theory and Decision 11 (1):95--110.
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  34.  19 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1997). Supposition as Quantification Versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect. Topoi 16 (1):41-63.
    This paper follows up a suggestion by Paul Vincent Spade that there were two Medieval theories of the modes of personal supposition. I suggest that early work by Sherwood and others was a study of quantifiers: their semantics and the effects of context on inferences that can be made from quantified terms. Later, in the hands of Burley and others, it changed into a study of something else, a study of what I call global quantificational effect. For example, although the (...)
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  35.  16 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2006). The Doctrine of Distribution. History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (1):59-74.
    Peter Geach describes the ?doctrine of distribution? as the view that a term is distributed if it refers to everything that it denotes, and undistributed if it refers to only some of the things that it denotes. He argues that the notion, so explained, is incoherent. He claims that the doctrine of distribution originates from a degenerate use of the notion of ?distributive supposition? in medieval supposition theory sometime in the 16th century. This paper proposes instead that the doctrine of (...)
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  36.  14 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1970). Criticism of "Are Predicates and Relational Expressions Incomplete?". Philosophical Review 79 (2):240-245.
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  37.  13 DLs
    Terence Parsons & Peter Woodruff (1995). Worldly Indeterminacy of Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:171 - 191.
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  38.  11 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2002). Eventualities and Narrative Progression. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):681-699.
  39.  11 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1987). On the Consistency of the First-Order Portion of Frege's Logical System. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (1):161-168.
  40.  10 DLs
    Terence Parsons, Pronouns as Paraphrases.
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  41.  10 DLs
    Terence Parsons, Translations.
    The Treatise on Univocation is an early work on the fallacy called univocation. This fallacy is a kind of ambiguity due to the shifted reference of words in a sentence when the ambiguity does not fall under the well-known Aristotelian kinds (equivocation, composition and division, . . .). Examples include the shift of reference of common terms due to tense and modality; e.g. the shift whereby the reference of 'giraffe' is extended to past or future giraffes when the tense of (...)
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  42.  9 DLs
    Terence Parsons (2014). Articulating Medieval Logic. OUP Oxford.
    Terence Parsons presents a new study of the development and continuing value of medieval logic, which expanded Aristotle's basic principles of logic in important ways. Parsons argues that the resulting system is as rich as contemporary first-order symbolic logic.
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  43.  8 DLs
    Donald A. Martin, Terence Parsons & Alexander Kechris (1985). Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1094-1102.
  44.  8 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1980). Nonexistent Objects. Yale University Press.
  45.  7 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1975). Afterthoughts on Mass Terms. Synthese 31 (3-4):517 - 521.
    This is a short note indicating how I would revise an earlier paper ("an analysis of mass terms and amount terms," "foundations of language", Volume 6, Number 3, 1970) in the light of criticisms that have been made of it.
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  46.  6 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1978). Critical Notice. Synthese 39 (1):155-164.
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  47.  6 DLs
    Terence Parsons (1983). Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond by Richard Routley. Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):173-179.
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  48.  6 DLs
    Peter Woodruff & Terence Parsons (1999). Set Theory with Indeterminacy of Identity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):473-495.
    We presume a background theory which allows for indeterminacy of states of affairs involving objects, extending even to indeterminacy of identity between objects. A sentence reporting such an indeterminate state of affairs lacks truth-value. We extend this to a theory of sets, similar to ZFU, in which membership in, and identity between, sets may also be indeterminate.
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  49.  6 DLs
    Terence Parsons, Supposi T I o N as Quant I F I C a T I o N Versus Supposi T I o N as Globa L Quant I F I C a T I o N a L Ef Fec T.
    Spade 1988 sugges t s tha t t he r e are ac tua l l y two theo r i e s t o address t h i s ques t i o n t o , an ear l y one and a l a t e r one . 2 Most o f the presen t pape r i s a deve l o pmen t o f t h i s i dea . I sugges t (...)
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