Richard Rorty: Philosophy by Other Means

Metaphilosophy 31 (5):529-546 (2000)
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Abstract

Richard Rorty’s argumentative strategy – variously termed “pragmatist,”“postmodernist,” and “postphilosophical”– is examined in some detail in the context of his treatment of philosophical issues in general and of the views of other philosophers in particular, for instance, Putnam, Davidson, Quine, Sellars, Dennett, and Frazer. Attention is paid particularly to the compatibility between pragmatist, “analytic,” and postmodernist modes of argument; Rorty’s “redescriptions” of alternative philosophical views; and the philosophical import of Rorty’s “abandonment” of philosophical argument.

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Joseph Margolis
Last affiliation: Temple University

Citations of this work

Rorty on Realism and Constructivism.James A. Stieb - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):272-294.

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