On the imaginative constructivist nature of design: a theoretical approach

Abstract

Most empirical accounts of design suggest that designing is an activity where objects and representations are progressively constructed. Despite this fact, whether design is a constructive process or not is not a question directly addressed in the current design research. By contrast, in other fields such as Mathematics or Psychology, the notion of constructivism is seen as a foundational issue. The present paper defends the point of view that forms of constructivism in design need to be identified and integrated as a founda- tional element in design research as well. In fact, a look at the literature reveals at least two types of constructive processes that are well embedded in design research: first, an interac- tive constructivism, where a designer engages a conversation with media, that allows changing the course of the activity as a result of this interaction; second, a social constructivism, where designers need to handle communication and nego- tiation aspects, that allows integrating individuals' expertise into the global design process. A key feature lacking these well-established paradigms is the explicit consideration of creativity as a central issue of design. To explore how cre- ative and constructivist aspects of design can be taken into account conjointly, the present paper pursues a theoretical approach. We consider the roots of constructivism in math- ematics, namely the Intuitionist Mathematics, in order to shed light on the original insights that led to the development of a notion of constructivism. Intuitionists describe mathe- matics as the process of mental mathematical constructions realized by a creative subject over time. One of the most original features of intuitionist constructivism is the intro- duction of incomplete objects into the heart of mathematics by means of lawless sequences and free choices. This allows the possibility to formulate undecided propositions and the consideration of creative acts within a formal constructive process. We provide an in-depth analysis of intuitionism from a design standpoint showing that the original notion is more than a pure constructivism where new objects are a mere bottom-up combination of already known objects. Rather, intuitionism describes an imaginative constructivist process that allows combining bottom-up and top-down processes and the expansion of both propositions and objects with free choices of a creative subject. We suggest that this new form of constructivism we identify is also relevant in interpreting conventional design processes and discuss its status with respect to other forms of constructivism in design

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,783

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

The Many Faces of Mathematical Constructivism.B. Kerkhove & J. P. Bendegem - 2012 - Constructivist Foundations 7 (2):97-103.
Hegel and Epistemological Constructivism.Tom Rockmore - 2006 - Idealistic Studies 36 (3):183-190.
Is informatics a design discipline?Peter Purgathofer - 2006 - Poiesis and Praxis 4 (4):303-314.
Investigating ethical issues in engineering design.Ibo Poel - 2001 - Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (3):429-446.
Investigating ethical issues in engineering design.Ibo van de Poel - 2001 - Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (3):429-446.
Aristotelian constructivism.Mark LeBar - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):182-213.
Interactive constructivism in education.Kersten Reich - 2007 - Education and Culture 23 (1):7-26.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-01-17

Downloads
36 (#442,490)

6 months
1 (#1,467,486)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.
Principia Mathematica.A. N. Whitehead & B. Russell - 1927 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 2 (1):73-75.

View all 32 references / Add more references