Abstract

In this article, we discuss how body plays a role in cognition. For this purpose, constitutive and causal approaches in the cognitive science are reviewed. This review addresses the problems of these approaches, including that both of them ultimately lead to a Cartesian-objective understanding of body-cognition relationship as well as reduce the body to the physical body. In addition, proponents of constitutive approach such as Clark cannot reconstruct the phenomenological formulation of constitution at the embodied cognition, which results in return of Cartesian approach to cognition. Given Heidegger's phenomenological approach, we explain these problems and suggest a way to overcome them. Heideggerian foundations help us to formulate two notions of embodiment: ready-to-hand embodiment and fundamental embodiment. Both notions of embodiment deny the physicalist understanding of embodiment which is dominant in cognitive science. In the next step, we examine Heidegger's attempt to move to a more fundamental level in the analysis of being in view of his hints about embodiment in Being and Time and explain why Heidegger does not remain at the embodied analysis of being.