Conservatism and the Scientific State of Nature

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1057-1076 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices. These comments reveal an underlying presumption that scientists do best when left alone—when they operate in what we call the ‘scientific state of nature’. Through computer simulation, we challenge this presumption by illustrating an inefficiency that arises in the scientific state of nature. This inefficiency suggests that one cannot simply presume that science is most efficient when institutional control is absent. In some situations, actively encouraging unpopular, risky science would improve scientific outcomes. 1 Introduction2 Scientists and Bandits3 Choosing an ϵ4 Structure of Communication5 Discussion

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is Science Really a Young Man’s Game?K. Brad Wray - 2003 - Social Studies of Science 33 (1):137-49.
Democracy, elitism, and scientific method.Paul Feyerabend - 1980 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):3 – 18.
We are not Witnesses to a New Scientific Revolution.Gregor Schiemann - 2011 - In Alfred Nordmann, Hans Radder & Gregor Schiemann (eds.), Science Transformed?: Debating Claims of an Epochal Break. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 31-42.
The cognitive structure of scientific theories.Ronald N. Giere - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):276-296.
How to judge scientific research articles.Hennie Lotter - 2000 - South African Journal for Language Teaching 34.
The Moral Terrain of Science.Heather Douglas - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S5):1-19.
Scientists' thoughts on scientific models.Daniela M. Bailer-Jones - 2002 - Perspectives on Science 10 (3):275-301.
Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress.James A. Marcum - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-03

Downloads
79 (#210,413)

6 months
22 (#121,906)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Kevin Zollman
Carnegie Mellon University
Erich Kummerfeld
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

On fraud.Liam Kofi Bright - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):291-310.
Scientific polarization.Cailin O’Connor & James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):855-875.

View all 39 citations / Add more citations