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  1. S. Alan Corlew (2002). Michael Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge and its Implications for Christianity. Christianity and Society 12 (3):16-23.
    This article explores the implications of Michael Polanyi's concept of Tacit Knowledge for religious belief in general, and Christianity in particular, by investigating the relationship of tacit knowledge to commitment in scientific investigation, and extrapolating that relationship to commitments in the area of religious belief.
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  2. Azam Golam (2009). Some Reflections on Whewell's Scientific Methodology. Journal of Sociology 1 (2):71-89.
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  3. Paul Silva Jr (2015). On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs. Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.
    According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that (...)
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  4. Paul Silva Jr (2013). How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
    Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...)
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