``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist"
In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Erik J. Olsson (2011). Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem. Social Epistemology 25 (2):173 - 182.
Joachim Horvath (2009). Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):115-120.
J. Adam Carter & Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Against Swamping. Analysis 72 (4):690-699.
Duncan Pritchard (2011). What is the Swamping Problem? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Justin P. McBrayer (2007). Process Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, and the Value of Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):289-302.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Alan Hájek (1996). “Mises Redux” — Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):209--27.
Campbell Brown (2012). The Utility of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 77 (2):155-65.
Alan Hájek (2010). Mises Redux-Redux : Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
Jonathan Schaffer (2009). Knowing the Answer Redux. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):477-500.
Erik J. Olsson (2009). In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.
Jonathan Harrison (1999). The Impossibility of ‘Possible’ Worlds. Philosophy 74 (1):5-28.
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2010-11-29Total downloads0Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |

