Sosa on epistemic circularity and reflective knowledge

Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194 (2009)
Abstract
Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.
Keywords Sosa  epistemic virtue  epistemic circularity  reflective knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jonathan Vogel (2000). Reliabilism Leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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