Graduate studies at Western
Metaphilosophy 40 (2):187-194 (2009)
|Abstract||Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.|
|Keywords||Sosa epistemic virtue epistemic circularity reflective knowledge|
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