Dretske on knowledge closure

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394 (2006)
Abstract
In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios (such as being a brain in a vat) do not hold.
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References found in this work BETA
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Steven Luper (2007). Moore's Missing Principle. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):151-161.
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