David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 65 (2):143 - 164 (2006)
Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan’s objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence. I argue that Lycan’s objection fails for equivocation but that some specific forms of minimalism are better able than others to articulate that defense.
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
L. S. Carrier (1994). Does Knowledge Entail Justification? International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):413-418.
Richard Foley (1983). Epistemic Conservatism. Philosophical Studies 43 (2):165 - 182.
Citations of this work BETA
David B. Martens (2010). William Heytesbury and the Conditions for Knowledge. Theoria 76 (4):355-374.
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