The Demands of Consequentialism

Oxford University Press (2001)
Abstract
Tim Mulgan presents a penetrating examination of consequentialism: the theory that human behavior must be judged in terms of the goodness or badness of its consequences. The problem with consequentialism is that it seems unreasonably demanding, leaving us no room for our own aims and interests. In response, Mulgan offers his own, more practical version of consequentialism--one that will surely appeal to philosophers and laypersons alike.
Keywords Consequentialism (Ethics
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Call number BJ1031.M83 2001
ISBN(s) 0199286973   9780199286973
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Brian McElwee (2011). Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):457-466.
Leonard Kahn (2013). Rule Consequentialism and Disasters. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.
William Sin (2012). Internalization and Moral Demands. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):163-175.

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