Ramsey Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1373-1384 (2005)
John Worrall recently provided an account of epistemic structural realism, which explains the success of science by arguing for the correct mathematical structure of our theories. He accounts for the historical failures of science by pointing to bloated ontological interpretations of theoretical terms. In this paper I argue that Worrall’s account suffers from five serious problems. I also show that Pierre Cruse and David Papineau have developed a rival structural realism that solves all of the problems faced by Worrall. This Ramsey-sentence realism is a significant advance in the debate, but still ultimately fails for its incomplete account of reference.
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DOI 10.1086/508975
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Samuel Ruhmkorff (2014). Global and Local Pessimistic Meta-Inductions. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):409-428.

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