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  1. John Worrall, Adhocness and Content-Increase: Is There Life After Grünbaum? John Worrall.
    Most of us believe that theory-change in science has been a rationally analysable process. We believe, that is, that when one theory, Newton’s for example, is replaced as the accepted theory in science by a rival, Einstein’s in the same example, it is because the newer theory turns out to be better than the old in some objective sense and a sense, moreover, crucially related to the experimental evidence. Even those who have abjectly surrendered (at any rate on Mondays, Wednesdays (...)
     
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  2. John Worrall, Does Science Discredit Religion?
    JOHN WORRALL (ABOUT TO APPEAR –W ITH REPLY BY DEL RATZCH – IN PETERSON AND VANARRAGON (EDS) CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. BLACKWELL) We get the ages of rock, and they get the rock of ages; we work out how the heavens go and they work out how to get to heaven.
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  3. John Worrall, 1. Introduction: The 'Threat' to Realism From Underdetermination.
    The appeal of scientific realism is chiefly based on the – staggering – empirical success of the theories currently accepted in science. The realist exhibits some currently accepted scientific theory (the General Theory of Relativity, say), points to its astounding empirical success (with the gravitational redshift, the precession of Mercury’s perihelion, etc) and suggests that it would be monumentally implausible to suppose that the theory could score such empirical successes and yet not reflect, at least to some good approximation, the (...)
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  4. John Worrall, Miracles, Pessimism and Scientific Realism.
    Worrall ([1989]) argued that structural realism provides a ‘synthesis’ of the main pro-realist argument – the ‘No Miracles Argument’, and the main anti-realist argument – the ‘Pessimistic Induction’. More recently, however, it has been claimed (Howson [2000] and Lewis [2001], respectively) that each of these arguments is an instance of the same probabilistic fallacy – sometimes called the ‘base-rate fallacy’. If correct, this clearly seems to undermine structural realism and Magnus and Callender have indeed claimed that both arguments are fallacious (...)
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  5. John Worrall, Prediction and Accommodation Revisited.
    The paper presents a further articulation and defence of the view on prediction and accommodation that I have proposed earlier. It operates by analysing two accounts of the issue-by Patrick Maher and by Marc Lange-that, at least at first sight, appear to be rivals to my own. Maher claims that the time-order of theory and evidence may be important in terms of degree of confirmation, while that claim is explicitly denied in my account. I argue, however, that when his account (...)
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  6. John Worrall (2011). The No Miracles Intuition and the No Miracles Argument. In. In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Springer. 11--21.
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  7. John Worrall (2011). Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence. Synthese 180 (2):157 - 172.
    Are theories 'underdetermined by the evidence' in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically (...)
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  8. John Worrall (2010). Evidence: Philosophy of Science Meets Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):356-362.
    Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess – or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this (...)
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  9. John Worrall (2010). Error, Tests, and Theory Confirmation. In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  10. John Worrall (2010). For Universal Rules, Against Induction. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):740-753.
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  11. John Worrall (2010). Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence. In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press. 125.
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  12. John Worrall (2009). Do We Need Some Large, Simple Randomized Trials in Medicine? Epsa.
    In a randomized clinical trial (RCT), a group of patients, initially assembled through a mixture of deliberation (involving explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria) and serendipity (which patients happen to walk into which doctor’s clinic while the trial is in progress), are divided by some random process into an experimental group (members of which will receive the therapy under test) and a control group (members of which will receive some other treatment – perhaps placebo, perhaps the currently standard treatment for the (...)
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  13. John Worrall (2008). Evidence and Ethics in Medicine. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 51 (3):418-431.
    Ethics and epistemology in medicine are more closely and more interestingly intertwined than is usually recognized. To explore this relationship, I present a case study, clinical trials of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO; an intervention for persistent pulmonary hypertension of the newborn).Three separate ethical issues that arise from this case study-whether or not it is ethical to perform a certain trial at all, whether stopping rules for trials are ethically mandated, and the issue of informed consent-are all shown to be intimately (...)
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  14. John Worrall, Adhocness and Content-Increase: Is There Life After Grünbaum?
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  15. John Worrall, Confirmation: Two Types, Both Logical Not Historical.
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  16. John Worrall (2007). Evidence in Medicine and Evidence-Based Medicine. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):981–1022.
  17. John Worrall (2007). Miracles and Models: Why Reports of the Death of Structural Realism May Be Exaggerated. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (61):125-154.
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  18. John Worrall (2007). Why There's No Cause to Randomize. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):451-488.
    The evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is widely regarded as supplying the ‘gold standard’ in medicine—we may sometimes have to settle for other forms of evidence, but this is always epistemically second-best. But how well justified is the epistemic claim about the superiority of RCTs? This paper adds to my earlier (predominantly negative) analyses of the claims produced in favour of the idea that randomization plays a uniquely privileged epistemic role, by closely inspecting three related arguments from leading contributors (...)
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  19. Colin Cheyne & John Worrall (eds.) (2006). Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Springer.
  20. John Worrall (2005). Prediction and the 'Periodic Law': A Rejoinder to Barnes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):817-826.
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  21. John Worrall, Theory-Confirmation and History.
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  22. John Worrall (2003). John Kadvany, Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason. Metascience 12 (1):79-83.
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  23. John Worrall (2003). Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn 'Versus' Popper and Lakatos. In Thomas Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press. 65.
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  24. John Worrall, A Bridge Over Troubled Cultures. The Impact of Philosophy of Science in Britain.
    Who are the major figures that have shaped philosophy of science in Britain? What impact has the subject had in Britain outside academic philosophy? How have two of the major centers of the subject - in Pittsburgh and in London - interacted over the years? I begin by looking briefly at the recent history of philosophy of science in Britain and its general impact (tying this in with its interaction with the Pittsburgh Center and Pittsburgh people. It seems to me, (...)
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  25. John Worrall (2002). 'Heuristic Power'and the 'Logic of Scientific Discovery': Why the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is Less Than Half of the Story. In G. Kampis, L.: Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Kluwer. 85--100.
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  26. John Worrall, Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Prospects.
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  27. John Worrall (2002). What Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S316-S330.
    Evidence-Based Medicine is a relatively new movement that seeks to put clinical med- icine on a firmer scientific footing. I take it as uncontroversial that medical practice should be based on best evidence-the interesting questions concern the details. This paper tries to move towards a coherent and unified account of best evidence in medicine, by exploring in particular the EBM position on RCTs (randomized controlled trials).
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  28. Eric Scerri & John Worrall (2001). Prediction and the Periodic Table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32 (3):407-452.
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  29. Jennifer Worrall & John Worrall (2001). Defining Disease: Much Ado About Nothing?. In. In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka & Evandro Agazzi (eds.), Life Interpretation and the Sense of Illness Within the Human Condition. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 33--55.
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  30. John Worrall, Pragmatic Factors in Theory-Acceptance.
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  31. John Worrall (2000). Tracking Track Records, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):207–235.
    [Peter Lipton] From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt (...)
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  32. John Worrall (2000). Tracking Track Records. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):207-35.
    [Peter Lipton] From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt (...)
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  33. John Worrall, Deborah G. Mayo, J. J. C. Smart & Barry Barnes (2000). What is This Thing Called Philosophy of Science? Metascience 9 (2):172-198.
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  34. John Worrall (1999). Two Cheers for Naturalised Philosophy of Science - Or: Why Naturalised Philosophy of Science is Not the Cats's Whiskers. Science and Education 8 (4):339-361.
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  35. John Worrall (1995). Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):279-295.
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  36. John Worrall (1995). 'Revolution in Permanence': Popper on Theory-Change in Science. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:75-102.
  37. John Worrall (1994). Book Review:Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory John Earman. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 61 (4):672-.
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  38. John Worrall (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 103 (410):672-.
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  39. John Worrall (1994). How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the "Luminiferous Ether". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:334 - 342.
    Fresnel's theory of light was (a) impressively predictively successful yet (b) was based on an "entity" (the elastic-solid ether) that we now "know" does not exist. Does this case "confute" scientific realism as Laudan suggested? Previous attempts (by Hardin and Rosenberg and by Kitcher) to defuse the episode's anti-realist impact. The strongest form of realism compatible with this case of theory-rejection is in fact structural realism. This view was developed by Poincare who also provided reasons to think that it is (...)
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  40. John Worrall (1990). Rationality, Sociology and the Symmetry Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):305 – 319.
    Abstract This paper attempts to clarify the debate between those philosophers who hold that the development of science is governed by objective standards of rationality and those sociologists of science who deny this. In particular it focuses on the debate over the ?symmetry thesis?. Bloor and Barnes argue that a properly scientific approach to science itself demands that an investigator should seek the same general type of explanation for all decisions and actions by past scientists, quite independently of whether or (...)
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  41. John Worrall (1990). Scientific Revolutions and Scientific Rationality: The Case of the Elderly Holdout. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. 14--319.
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  42. John Worrall (1989). 98 Evandro Agazzi. Dialectica 43 (1-2).
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  43. John Worrall (1989). Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):376-388.
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  44. John Worrall (1989). Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? Dialectica 43 (1-2):99-124.
    The no-miracles argument for realism and the pessimistic meta-induction for anti-realism pull in opposite directions. Structural Realism---the position that the mathematical structure of mature science reflects reality---relieves this tension.
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  45. John Worrall (1989). Why Both Popper and Watkins Fail to Solve the Problem of Induction. In. In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality. Reidel. 257--296.
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  46. John Worrall (1989). W minnesota centerfor '. philosophyof science. Dialectica 43 (1-2):99-124.
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  47. John Worrall (1988). Review: The Value of a Fixed Methodology. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):263 - 275.
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  48. John Worrall (1988). The Value of a Fixed Methodology. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):263-275.
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  49. John Worrall (1985). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):81-85.
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  50. John Worrall & Nicholas Jardine (1985). The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science. Kepler's `A Defence of Tycho Against Ursus' with Essays on its Provenance and Significance. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):311.
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