David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):181 – 189 (1990)
Abstract This paper argues that both technological determinism (the development of technology is uniquely determined by internal laws) and technological voluntarism (technological change can be externally directed and regulated by the wants and free choice of human beings) are one?sided and partly mistaken. The determinists are right in the sense that technology has a power to influence our values and behaviour, and thereby appear to direct ?technological imperatives? to us. However, such commands are always conditional on some value premises; the voluntarists are thus right in pointing out that we need not obey such imperatives. The principle ?Can implies Ought? (all technological possibilities should be realized) is therefore invalid
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jacques Ellul (1964). The Technological Society. New York, Knopf.
Jon Elster (1983). Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science. Universitetsforlaget.
Ilkka Niiniluoto (1986). Hypothetical Imperatives and Conditional Obligations. Synthese 66 (1):111 - 133.
Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1978). Invisible-Hand Explanations. Synthese 39 (2):263 - 291.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Joseph C. Pitt (2006). Human Beings as Technological Artifacts. In John R. Dakers (ed.), Defining Technological Literacy: Towards an Epistemological Framework. Palgrave Macmillan.
León Olive (1986). Representación Y Resistencia Al Cambio Científico. Theoria 1 (3):621-640.
Laurens Landeweerd, Patricia Osseweijer & Julian Kinderlerer (2009). Distributing Responsibility in the Debate on Sustainable Biofuels. Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (4):531-543.
Wade Rowland (2005). Recognizing the Role of the Modern Business Corporation in the "Social Construction" of Technology. Social Epistemology 19 (2 & 3):287 – 313.
Hubert L. Dreyus & Charles Spinosa (1997). Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology. [REVIEW] Man and World 30 (2):159-178.
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2008). Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking the Phenomenology of Human–Technology Relations. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):387-395.
Martin Carrier (2010). Theories for Use: On the Bearing of Basic Science on Practical Problems. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. 23--33.
M. Rosaria Nucci Pearce & David Pearce (1989). Technology Vs. Science: The Cognitive Fallacy. Synthese 81 (3):405 - 419.
Iain Thomson (2000). What's Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg. Inquiry 43 (4):429 – 444.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #156,754 of 1,139,978 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #157,515 of 1,139,978 )
How can I increase my downloads?