Essences and Discovery: Plato, Locke, and Leibniz

Dialogue 3 (3):219-234 (1964)
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Abstract

According to Plato's Republic, human knowledge in highest form owes its existence to a priori discoveries made during the course of dialectical investigations. Being a priori, such discoveries are neither empirical observations nor conclusions based upon empirical observations, although in some cases they may be “occasioned” by experience. They are matter for intellectual, not literal, vision, and making them is what distinguishes the successful philosopher from the non-philosopher. Thus, in the Phaedo, Plato is in a position to argue that the separation of the soul from the body in death is no evil for a genuine philosopher: he has no need to rely on the bodily senses in order to acquire philosophical knowledge; and he is well free of the errors and confusion generated by the senses, and of the physical desires nourished in the soul as a result of residing in a body.

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