On the d-n model of scientific explanation

Philosophy of Science 37 (3):417-433 (1970)
This paper discusses the D-N model of scientific explanation. It is suggested that explanation is a part of assertive discourse where certain principles must be observed. Then use is made of the relation between the informative content and logical content of a sentence (as shown, for instance, by Popper) to draw some of the conditions necessary for a sound model. It is claimed that the conditions of the model proposed in the present paper exhaust the insights of the papers in the literature, solve the difficulties encountered by other authors, but have some damaging consequences on the D-N model of scientific explanation
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Charles G. Morgan (1976). Tuomela on Deductive Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):511 - 525.
    András Kertész (1988). Zur Bewertung der Pragmatischen Erklärungsmodelle. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 19 (2):239-251.
    I. A. Omer (1983). Better Deductive Explanation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 14 (2):350-353.
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