Locke's Exclusion Argument

History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):181-196 (2010)
In this paper, I argue that Locke is not in fact agnostic about the ultimate nature of the mind. In particular, he produces an argument, much like Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument, to show that any materialist view that takes mental states to supervene on physical states is committed to epiphenomenalism. This result helps illuminate Locke's otherwise puzzling notion of 'superaddition.'
Keywords Locke  Exclusion problem  superaddition
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Walter Ott, Locke's Exclusion Argument
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
David Pineda (2002). The Causal Exclusion Puzzle. European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):26-42.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
Lei Zhong (2011). Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):129-147.
Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
Walter R. Ott (2002). Locke and Signification. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:449-473.
Ned Block (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
Walter Ott (2012). What is Locke's Theory of Representation? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1077-1095.
Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

114 ( #25,380 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

31 ( #32,901 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.