In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution (1999)
|Abstract||Dretske has recently offered a representational theory of perceptual experience - considered as paradigmatic of the qualitative and phenomenal aspects of our mental life. This theory belongs, as do his previous works, to a naturalistic approach to mental representation|
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