Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?

Synthese 199 (5-6):12663-12682 (2021)
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Abstract

How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the meta-logic. It turns out that there are some meta-logical challenges specifically for the pluralists. I will argue that these depend on an implicitly assumed absoluteness of correct logic. Pluralists can solve the challenges by giving up on this absoluteness and instead adopt contextualism about correct logic. This contextualism is naturalistically appealing.

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Author's Profile

Robert Passmann
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Roberto Minio.
Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2014 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

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