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Self enforceable paths in extensive form games
Theory and Decision 29 (1):69-83 (1990)
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Citations of this work
Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation.Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):163-185.
Dynamic focal points in N-person coordination games.F. Kramarz - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (3):277-313.
Are Game Theoretic Concepts Suitable Negotiation Support Tools? From Nash Equilibrium Refinements toward a Cognitive Concept of Rationality.Bertrand R. Munier - 1993 - Theory and Decision 34 (3):235.
A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games.Nabil Al-Najjar - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):173-193.
Planning in Firms as an Interactive Process.Jean-Pierre Ponssard - 1993 - Theory and Decision 34 (2):139.
References found in this work
The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author.Thomas C. Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.Reinhard Selten - 1975 - International Journal of Game Theory 4:25-55.
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