David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Peter Carruthers (ed.), Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press 13--46 (2000)
What are the elements from which the human mind is composed? What structures make up our _cognitive architecture?_ One of the most recent and intriguing answers to this question comes from the newly emerging interdisciplinary field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists defend a _massively modular_ conception of mental architecture which views the mind –including those parts responsible for such ‘central processes’ as belief revision and reasoning— as composed largely or perhaps even entirely of innate, special-purpose computational mechanisms or ‘modules’ that have been shaped by natural selection to handle the sorts of recurrent information processing problems that confronted our hunter-gatherer forebears (Cosmides and Tooby,192; Sperber, 1994; Samuels, 1998a)
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Joseph Shieber (2012). A Partial Defense of Intuition on Naturalist Grounds. Synthese 187 (2):321-341.
Mark R. Leary & Nicole R. Buttermore (2003). The Evolution of the Human Self: Tracing the Natural History of Self‐Awareness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):365-404.
Peter Carruthers (2003). Moderately Massive Modularity. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 67-89.
Peter Carruthers (2003). Moderately Massive Modularity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:67-89.
Stefan Linquist & Alex Rosenberg (2007). The Return of the Tabula Rasa. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):476–497.
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